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My thesis in this paper is that the logic of cognition, lets call it epistemic logic, and the logic of ac-
tion, lets call it – with Bourdieu 1977 – logic of practice, are different aspects of one and the same 
meaning-formation. I shall allege that this logic is – in Ricœurs 2001 words – a hermeneutics or 
logic of meaning. I also agree with Ricœur that it is a reflexive or circular probability logic. In this, 
it comes in my opinion close to Peirce’s theory of abduction as a probabilistic logic of discovery. 
My own contribution to this sequence of ideas is to show that this logic of meaning by the same 
token is a logic of communication.    
 
I will start my considerations with an idea from Ricœur 2002. The idea goes as follows: the forma-
tion of both textual and practical meaning is a reflexive or circular process of objectivization. In 
reference to Kant’s 2000 Critique of the Power of Judgment Ricœur takes this hermeneutical proc-
ess of meaning-generation as a reflexive probability logic. 
 
Next I will look at Cassirer’s 1953 [1910] theory of symbolization. I’ll take as my point of depar-
ture his functionalistic theory of conceptualisation. I confess that I read this theory as a paraphrase 
of Frege’s 1891 understanding of concepts as propositional functions. In other words, I presume 
that Cassirer 1953, in the same way as Frege 1891, sees the concept or predicate as a principle or 
rule of generating propositions, which are either intensional thoughts or extensional truth-values. 
A concept understood as propositional function is therefore according to Cassirer to be understood 
as an intellectual (Verstandes) action. Cassirer 2001 expresses this idea in the first volume of the 
Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, referring to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Kant 1998 says:  
 
“Thus the knowledge of every, at least of the human, understanding is a cognition through 
concepts, not intuitive but discursive. All intuitions, as sensible, rest on affections, concepts 
therefore on functions. By a function, however, I understand the unity of the action of or-
dering different representations under one common one. Concepts are therefore grounded 
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on the spontaneity of thinking, as sensible intuitions are grounded on the receptivity of im-
pressions.” (Kant 1998, 205) 
 
The question is, however, how impressions and concepts are linked up to generate our knowledge 
of things. Cassirer 1953 says: 
 
“The impression of the object and the object itself are separated from each other; instead 
of identity, the relation of representation appears. No matter how complete our knowledge 
may be in itself, it never offers us the objects themselves, but only signs of them and their 
reciprocal relations.” (Cassirer 1953, 303) 
 
Signs are things representing other things for someone, a bearer of consciousness, a psychological 
subject. Knowledge through signs is not immediate knowledge of an object, but knowledge by 
means of something used as a medium to know something else. To use something as a medium to 
recognize something else is by Cassirer 2001 also called objectivization (o.c., 4). Thus ‘knowing’ 
means the same as ‘objectifying’, or ‘making something an object’ for someone. In epistemology 
‘something’ represents here a psychological subjects experience (Husserl: Erlebnis) of some thing 
or other. If this subject succeeds in making his or her experience an object, that is to say objectify-
ing it, then he or she understands his or her experience as representing a particular thing. The logi-
cal means of objectivization is what Cassirer 1953 calls a concept. Concepts objectify experiences 
to things or objects. The mental process of objectifying is called thinking or understanding and re-
sults in a predication or proposition. It is verbally expressed by a sentence, i.e. by a syntactical 
structure of signs that carry out different functions in this structure. In a similar way as Frege 1891 
(“Function and Concept”) Cassirer 1953 understands concepts as logical, that is to say proposi-
tional, functions. There is more to say about this later on. For now we can resume that according to 
Cassirer to understand that something is or does something else is a process of objectivization by 
means of signs, and therefore, by the same token, it is a process of mediation. “All objectivization 
is”, says Cassirer (2001, 4), “in fact mediation”.  
 
Actions, the practical functions producing artefacts and generating culture, can – according to 
Ricœur 2001 – be seen as the practical version of meaning-formation. They presuppose – according 
to Cassirer 1994 – the cognitive formation of meaning (sc. 26). Performing an action, one can say, 
is materially (not metaphorically) realizing the idea of a possible thing or an event. Actions thus can 
be understood as the practical counterpart of concepts or of cognitive meaning functions. Lets say, 
actions are practical meaning functions – practical rules or recipes of meaning production.      
 
My third step is retrieved from Bourdieu’s (1977,1993, 1996) theory of theoretical, aesthetical and 
practical production of meaningful artefacts and culture as a dynamic logic of practice-fields. I un-
derstand ‘practice-field’ as a dynamic, changeable and nondeterministic system of mediations. The 
carriers of mediating-processes that may take place in various forms of practice-fields are different 
forms of power – intellectual or aesthetical, i.e. cultural, social, and economic forms of power. All 
these forms of practical power are to be understood as an agent’s possibility to act – that is as poten-
tial acts or abilities to act. Actions, thus, are to be considered as performances of action-power. 
There exist according to Bourdieu three different manifestations of action-power, called habitus, 
capital, and (practice-) field. Habitus is action-power as incorporated in a human agent – lets call it 
the subjective appearance of action-power. Capital is objectively realized action-power – material 
products and at the same time media of action. There exist as many kinds of capital as there exist 
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kinds of action-power – cultural, social, and economic capital. I will call these kinds of materialized 
action-power action-media. A practice-field is so to say a “universe of social interaction possibili-
ties” consisting of social agents with their habitus’ and different forms of capital that in synergy 
with each other make it possible for the field-agents to act in a meaningful way. From an epistemo-
logical point of view practice-fields should be understood as action-environments. These environ-
ments guarantee that intentions adapted to the material, cultural, and social conditions of the envi-
ronment can become realized through action. Practice-fields are practical meaning-spaces or practi-
cal meaning-environments. These spaces make it possible for their agents to act meaningfully on 
account of a kind of practical communication – not only between different agents but also between 
the individual agent’s habitus and the different forms of capital being available to the agents in the 
field. 
 
Let’s summarize: The formation or generation of meaning is – according to Ricœur 2002 and Cas-
sirer 2001 – a process of objectivization. It is according to Ricœur also reflexive or circular, and it is 
probabilistic. This holds in the same way for cognitive and practical processes of meaning forma-
tion. Knowledge, as a result of cognitive formation of meaning, is – according to Cassirer 1953 and 
2001 – a process of objectivization of a psychological subject’s experience through signs or sym-
bols. Knowledge is symbolization or mediating a subject’s experience through a concept with an 
object. Concepts are object-makers on the basis of experiences. In accordance with Frege’s 1891 
concept view, Cassirer 1953 understands concepts as propositional functions. There exists a close 
resemblance between Cassirer’s view of concepts understood as logical functions and Bourdieu’s 
view of habitus and capital understood as the subjective and objective side of practical functions. 
One could feel tempted to draw the pragmatist conclusion: thinking and acting are two sides of the 
same thing: thinking is virtual or symbolic action and acting is real or material thinking. 
  
I shall now look a little bit closer at the objectifying, functional, reflexive and probabilistic aspects 
of meaning formation: 
 
Objectivization 
Objectivization of verbal meaning means – according to Ricœur 2002 – to transcend and transform 
a utterer’s situated verbal utterance – also called discourse-event - of his/her internal experience into 
a written expression of meaning, which is independent of the uttering-situation – i.e. place, time, 
author, and addressee of utterance. This transcendence from situated to generic meaning is bound to 
objects that are able to carry the uttered meaning from the uttering situation to a spatio-temporal 
different receiving situation. Such objects are usually called signs or symbols. The process of mean-
ing-formation is a process of signification or symbolization. The signs or symbols, if they shall be 
able to fulfil this objectivization function of a process of meaning formation, have to be durable 
over time and transportable from place to place. Speech, the spoken sounds of words, phrases, sen-
tences or discourse, isn’t. Written text, ordered sequences of characters is. Locution, the transcen-
dence from uttering verbal signs to linguistic, that is meaningful, expressions of a subject’s experi-
ence, is the transcendence from his or her saying (Sagen) something to his or her having something 
to say (Aussagen), that is stating, proposing or predicating something. In this way ‘objectivization’ 
means two things at the same time:  
 
1. the transcendence from subjective, situated, and accidental meaning to subject-independent 
i.e. objective, situation-independent i.e. ubiquitous and essential meaning and 
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2. the translation or transformation of subjectively experiencing something to forming this ex-
perience or making it visible, audible or imaginable by signs or symbols. 
 
Both steps together make the process of meaning formation a process of symbolization, i.e. relating 
experience to an object. Incidentally, meaning formation and symbolization may be performed in a 
mute or aloud, a visible or invisible manner. We can either just imagine or utter it, either just intend 
or perform it. According to Ricœur, what here has been said about linguistic meaning formation and 
objectivization is also true of practical meaning-formation and production of meaningful things or 
artefacts. What is true of speech acts is also true of actions in general.     
 
In my opinion it is perfectly clear that Cassirer 1953 understands this objectifying process of mean-
ing-formation as a process of conceptualising as well as a process of symbolizing in the same broad 
Ricœurian sense, which includes both mental imagination, verbal expression, and practical produc-
tion of meaning. The process of conceptualising our experiences, i.e. of meaning-formation, is a 
process of signification or symbolization. Cassirer’s “Philosophy of Symbolic Forms”, with lan-
guage, myth, religion, arts and science as different patterns and developmental stages of meaning-
formation, is against this background to be understood both as a philosophy of culture and a phi-
losophy of science. It tries to amalgamate the logic of mythical, artistic or scientific discovery with 
the logic of justification of these different meaning forms. In other words, Cassirer’s answer to posi-
tivistic versions of a philosophy of science, which reserves logic to justification and leaves the dis-
covery of meaning to illogical processes of imagination, is a philosophy of symbolic – or in a more 
general, Peircean, sense semiotic – meaning-formation. The philosophy of symbolic forms identi-
fies logic with all kinds of meaning-formation: the linguistic, mythical, religious, artistic or scien-
tific relating of experiences to objects, the formation of concepts, the asserting of propositions, and 
the inferring of conclusions from premisses. Logic is present in all these different structures and 
developmental stages of meaning-formation or cultural production. In accordance with Kant and, by 
the way, also with Peirce, Cassirer 2001 understands this logic as constructive or synthetic logic. 
Meaning is not just given but has to be formed or constructed in order to become visible, audible, 
tangible or imaginable. Only after an experience has been formed, i.e. synthesised with or related to 
other experiences, a meaning can be analysed, that is broken up in parts or elements, in order to 
discover its building blocks and to understand its making and working. In order to understand the 
construction of the world and the working of reality, we have to reconstruct it symbolically or re-
produce it technically. To understand the world means, thus, to rebuild it from the only stuff we 
have to our disposal in order to accomplish this job – signs and symbols. 
 
Functionalization 
Signs and symbols, that is to say things that can be synthesized with or related to other things to 
form meaning, are a necessary condition of solving the problem of meaning formation but not yet 
sufficient. Signs or symbols are only the media, the instruments of the very activity of meaning 
formation. To mean something is taking something as related to or representing something else. In 
the end this taking is a making, a real action that makes something related to something else. That 
something, which is made to be or represent something else, is a sign, an objective carrier of mean-
ing. A carrier of meaning, a meaningful thing has a function – it can be used as a medium or instru-
ment to synthesize or connect things with each other. Assuming that something has such a function 
presupposes that something other has given it this function and that someone is able to detect it, that 
is to say to detect the relation between the first and the other thing.            
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There exists a remarkable relational-operational and subjective-objective ambivalence of the con-
cept of function. It is known that Frege 1891 took the concept from mathematics and adapted it to 
logical, i.e. conceptual, propositional, and inferential, conditions. In mathematics, ‘function’ means 
either a relation between elements of different sets or it means the operation that generates, as a 
result of applying an operation rule, the elements of a set from the elements of another set. A set can 
thus be seen as a coagulated or objectified operation and an operation as a liquefied or “operational-
ized” set. In this respect sets or classes are like concepts and the subjective and objective forms of 
action-power. In other regions (of thought) where the concept of function is in use it shows a similar 
ambiguity. The different organs in an organic system have functions, it is said, if they work as 
means to obtain an end favourable for this system. The function of the organ, say the heart, is to 
reach this end, say to make the blood circulate through the whole organism. On the one hand the 
organ is an organic function because of its operating manner. On the other hand it has a function in 
relation to the other organs and the whole organic system. An organ can in this way either be seen 
as an operating system or as the objective result of the operating of other operating systems that the 
organ is related to. Finally, a human agent or action-subject is said to carry out a function in an in-
stitution or organization, i.e. a system of social interactions, if he or she performs actions that have a 
favourable or desirable end for the institution and directly or indirectly for the agent him/herself. 
The agent’s function defines both his/her objective meaning for the organisation and his/her subjec-
tive meaning or position in the organisation. Bourdieu 1993 summarizes the ambiguity of the con-
cept of function by saying: 
 
…king, priest, banker are humanized hereditary monarchy, church, financial capital. The 
property acquires the proprietor by its embodiment as a structure for the generation of 
practices that perfectly correspond to its logic and requirements. (o.c., 107)   
 
Reflexivity 
The relational-operational ambiguity of the concept of function implies another feature of functional 
processes: their circularity or reflexivity. A concept, understood as a predicative or propositional 
function, can namely both be seen as a presupposition and as a result of the symbolically mediated 
process of meaning formation. Concepts represent on the one hand those objective properties that 
relate different things to each other in order to be recognized as instances of the same type of things 
or as instances of the same type of pairs, triples and so on of things. This objective or relational 
meaning is the result aspect of the concept or predicative function. On the other hand it can be seen 
as the accomplishment of the function of predicating something, that is to say that something is an 
instance of a type or has a certain property or relation to one or several other things. This is the op-
erational or subjective meaning aspect of the concept understood as predicative function. To predi-
cate a concept of an object means therefore at the same time to conceptualise the object and to ob-
jectify the concept. The object is made understandable by relating it to other things with similar 
properties or relations and the concept is made understandable by exemplifying it by some or other 
object with similar properties or relations as other objects that fall under the same concept. Thus the 
operational and the relational aspect of the concept or predicative function mutually presuppose 
each other. In other words, the predicative function is apparently circular or reflexive. Actually, to 




The reflexivity or circularity of meaning formation is notorious of the hermeneutic view of under-
standing and interpretation processes. Ricœur 2001 regards the transcendence from saying (uttering) 
to proposing (meaning) something as a reflexive process. In the syntactical structure of a sentence it 
moves from naming a thing functioning as grammatical subject to predicating a concept functioning 
as grammatical predicate or propositional function. The direction of the way of meaning formation 
that goes from naming the subject to predicating the concept, is to be understood as a kind of guess-
ing or assuming. It is a provisional relating a thing to a type of things, a property characterizing 
such a type, or to other things that possibly could in one way or other be related to our first thing. 
To know if this relation between subject and predicate holds the process of meaning formation shall 
turn around and move back from the predicate to the subject. The first move was to look if subject 
and predicate match. We assumed or guessed that they do. Moving back from the predicate to the 
subject means to check if the predicate understood as propositional function generates the subject. 
Don’t forget the relation-operation ambivalence of functions! A propositional function is both a 
relation between subject and predicate, and a logical or symbolical operation that generates the sub-
ject by applying an operation rule. I hope you can see the crazy circularity of the whole enterprise 
of meaning-formation. To know what a thing is, we have to relate it to other things. We move from 
– and thereby relate – our thing (subject) to a wholeness of things (predicate). To know if this rela-
tion holds we have to move back and look if this wholeness of things in fact is able to produce our 
thing. The first direction, the relational one, relates the thing to a class or type of thing. It conceptu-
alises our object and presupposes the existence of an operation that is able to produce the assumed 
relation. The second direction, the operational one, produces an object that is related in one or other 
way to all the other objects that are related to each other through the concept. This procedure of 
object-generating presupposes at least one other object that is able to function as raw material for 
producing our original object. A circular meaning formation is vicious if it just circles in itself 
without getting beyond its inbreeding circularity. In logic, i.e. in the formation processes of mean-
ing, such an inbreeding circularity is called tautology. In order to get out of a tautological meaning 
circularity an environment is necessary.   
 
Meaning and action environment       
I can only outline this last step of my considerations. Probability conclusions are meaningful only in 
a space or environment of possibilities. In a very broad sense, communication means the exchange 
of physical energy or information that is able to get a meaning through psycho-physical so-called 
“transduction” and sign-based intersubjective interaction between animals or humans. The critical 
point of the practice and theory of meaning formation is not the informational side. The world is full 
of energy, of all kinds of dynamics that synthesize and relate things to each other. Things happen as 
they are causally connected to other things. The effects they cause in other things are potential in-
formation for these things. The critical point of meaning-formation is not the information, the 
“meaning-stuff”, but its interpretation. That the sun is shining is information for all beings the sun 
actually is shining on. But what this means for the different natural classes, species, and individual 
beings under the sun, is another thing. It can mean innumerable different, good and bad things. That 
depends on the individual’s situation in and relations to its environment – its physical, psychical, 
and social environment. In an abstract sense, environment is a finite space of other things around 
and related to an individual. The physical network of things and relations around an individual is at 
the same time a possible semantic and pragmatic network for this individual – a space of possible 
interpretations and actions. A singular thing, a singular effect, a singular experience, a singular 
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thought means nothing unless in relation to other things, effects, experiences and thoughts. An indi-
vidual’s environment and its communication with it is the keystone of understanding the meaning 
of the world. This, if any, is a very Cassirerean idea.   
I will therefore conclude my considerations with a quote from Cassirer’s 1994 “On the logic of cul-
tural sciences” plea for the communicative function of logic. He says: 
 
What we grasp as the “meaning” of the world confronts us in any instance where we, in-
stead of enclosing us into our own world of perceptions, focus on something more-than-
individual, general, valid for all.... The spoken word never just vanishes in sound or call. It 
wants to mean something; it assembles itself to the whole of a „speech“, and that 
„speech“ exists only by going from one subject to another and binding both in dia-
logue...Logos ties the link between the individual and the whole; it assures the individual 
person that she, instead of being encapsulated in the mere sense of her own self, can reach 
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